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EXPANDABLE GOVERNMENT 
How a large, fluid and incoherent central administration 
avoids taking policy decisions 
 
This article argues that there is more than natural organizational empire-building in the 
permanent drive towards expansion of the central bureaucracy in Romania. This is just a 
symptom of a more profound institutional illness, characterized by: organizational 
instability and incoherence; strong tendency to increase bureaucracy in order to 
accommodate various interest and resolve turf wars; weak decision-making process, unable 
to analyze, formulate and integrate policies; and inability of the domestic policy community 
to discern trends, explain them to the public and the media, and identify the sources of 
negative developments when they occur. These weaknesses have been present in the 
Romanian institutional setting for a long time. They explain in good measure the poor 
performance of the country in the EU accession process, the protracted reforms, and verify 
the century-old drive to borrow Western institutional frameworks (most recently, the acquis 
communautaire) just as a cover for the traditional way of doing things.  
 
 
As the current Romanian government led by Adrian Nastase took office after the 
November 2000 elections, the old issue of instability and proliferation of central 
agencies was again put under the spotlight by journalists and analysts, both 
Romanian and foreign. The opposition and the commentators blamed the new Prime 
Minister for the growth of bureaucracy directly controlled by the parliamentary 
majority. Nastase replied that there is nothing new here and that the largest post-
Communist cabinet was not his, but that of the former PM Ciorbea (see Fig.1). 
Moreover, he pointed out that the increased number of ministries is compensated by 
a reduction in the number of independent agencies directly subordinated to the 
Prime Minister’s office – some of which became new ministries, while others were 
incorporated in the existing ministries. His argument is only partly correct: the 
agencies promoted as ministries expanded again their staff and budget, in an attempt 
to recuperate the status they had before the former premier Isărescu cut them down 
(we have already seen this happening); while some ministries are absolutely new.  
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Fig. 1. The number of portfolios in the Romanian cabinets after ’89 
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This article argues that there is more than meets the eye in the most recent 
expansion of the central bureaucracy in Romania. This is just the last symptom of a 
more profound institutional illness rooted in: organizational instability and 
incoherence; an unusually strong tendency to expand bureaucracy in order to 
accommodate various interest and resolve turf wars; and an inability of the domestic 
public policy analysts to identify structural tendencies, explain them to the public 
and the media, and name and shame the sources of such negative developments. 
These weaknesses have been present in the Romanian institutional setting for a long 
time and our main point here is that they explain in good measure the poor 
performance of our country in the EU accession process and the delay of reforms. 
Placing Romania in comparative perspective, using the other CEE states as a 
benchmark, given one an idea of the structural governance problems we face today. 
The fragmentation and fluidity of administrative establishment impact in turn on the 
profile of the civil service and the quality of the decision-making process.  
What we compare and why 
Institutions can mean all things to all people. The new institutionalist school 
operates with a broad definition to the term – as rules of the game that govern 
interactions in society, whether they are formal or informal. Other scholars go as far 
as incorporating shared values and psychological predispositions in the institutional 
framework. For the purpose of this analysis, however, we narrowed down the 
concept to those formal arrangements embodied in laws and organizations, the only 
ones that can be directly altered by intervention through public policy. More 
specifically, we refer here to the fundamental design of the central government 
structure and the assignment of functions among public agencies, a subject that first 
comes to mind when speaking about institutional reforms in Central and Eastern 
Europe.  
The following table compares the structure and functions of the central 
administration in Romania (the former cabinet Isărescu and the current cabinet 
Nastase) with that of other nine European countries. Of these, six are ex-Communist 
countries currently candidates for EU accession and constantly ranked ahead of 
Romania by the EU monitorization process – they can thus be regarded as a source 
of best-practices – while the other three are EU members. Like Romania, all nine 
are unitary states with various degrees of devolution of powers to the sub-national 
levels of government, so the whole comparison is legitimate. 
Of course, not all the differences in performance between European states are due to 
the structuring of their central administrations. Many specificities exist which are 
rooted in historical tradition or local institutional culture, and the uniformization 
was never on the EU agenda since these states are more or less functional anyway – 
compared with the scope and speed of the reforms under way in Central and Eastern 
Europe, the institutional changes in the member states take place at a rather 
geological pace. Moreover, not even in CEE can we see a single coherent blueprint 
for the management of reforms. There is no guarantee that if Romania adopted a 
certain prescribed framework of central administration, this would instantly solve all 
the problems and project the country into the EU.  
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Tab.1. The central government structure in Romania and 9 other EU candidate or 
member countries
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a) Line Finance X X X X4 X Xx6 X X X  Xx6 
 Foreign aff. X X X X X X X X X Xx8 X 
 Defence X X X X X X X X X X X 
 Home aff. X X X X X X7 X X X X X 
 Justice X X X X X X X X X X X 
 Health X X X X X X  X X  X 
 Labour-welfare X X X X X X X X X X Xx11 
 Agriculture X X X1 X X X1 X X X X X 
 Industry-trade X X  X     X  X 
 Environment X X X X X X X X X X X 
 Culture X X X X X X X X  X X 
 Education-science Xx X X X X X X X X Xx9 Xx9 
 Youth-sport X X        X  
 Transportations X X X X X X X X X X X 
 Public works  X         X 
 Comunications/IT X     X     X 
 Small-medium enterpr. X           
 Tourism X          X 
 Minorities  X     X    X12 
b) Coordinat. PM X X X X X X X X X X X 
 Chancellery X X Xx2 X X       
Economy - Economic coordinat.  X X  X X X X  X10  
Developm Privatization X           
 EU accession, negotiat. Xx          X13 
 Development, forecast X           
 Local/reg. developm.   X3 X X  X    X 
Administrativ ‘Public Function’ 
(Administration) 
X X        X X 
 Institutional reforms           X 
 Relat. with Parliament X   X5      X X 
 Speaker X           
 No. portfolios 27 20 17 17 16 16 15 14 13 17 26 
 
1 Agriculture and rural development 
2 National security 
3 Coordinates Phare programs 
4 Finance and economic policy  
5 Legislation 
6 State treasury separate from Finance 
7 Home affairs and administration 
8 EU affairs 
9 Research as a separate portfolio 
10 Super-ministry of economy, finance and 
industry  
11 Social solidarity 
12 Equal chances 
13 EU policies 
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However, the design of government matters. A well structured central 
administration may or may not produce good outputs, depending on other factors 
like the quality of leadership, the expertise available, motivation, resources. But a 
poorly structured central administration is sure to yield poor results, becoming 
itself a source of confusion and institutional noise. In such an environment it is 
more likely to have unclear assignment of responsibilities, overlapping, rivalries 
and captive agencies. 
Two opposing tendencies are obvious when we analyze the structure of central 
administrations in the EU candidate countries. On the one hand, the necessity to 
manage the thousand details of institutional alignment – in other words, to deal 
with the so-called orthodox paradox, i.e. the situation when the state has to reform 
itself fundamentally while still performing its everyday functions, which looks 
very much like an attempt to rebuild the ship piece by piece while sailing in high 
seas – and the obligation to continue to provide public goods and alleviate the 
social pains of transition, lead to the expansion and diversification of the public 
sector. On the other hand, the budgetary constraints and manageability 
considerations require a drastic limitation of the scope of government. Finding the 
right equilibrium between these opposing tendencies is a matter of applied policy 
rather than a theoretical issue.  
In spite of the differences between these societies, there are nevertheless some 
basic characteristics that define the whole region: the same socio-political system 
until a decade ago, the same direction of movement today, the same kind of social 
and administrative problems that the public sector faces. Even the basic 
constitutional arrangements differ surprisingly little in Central and Eastern Europe 
today: all countries have typically coalition governments with collective cabinet 
responsibility, a legislature which is not very strong and transformative (unlike the 
US Congress), being dominated by the executive, and carefully balanced 
President-Prime Minister systems that avoid the extreme cases of American-style 
presidentialism or British-style domination of the PM. The Polish president, for 
example, arguably the strongest in CEE, has less power than his French 
counterpart, while the Hungarian or the Czech presidents, even though elected by 
the parliaments, are more than symbolic figures when it comes to policy, unlike 
the German or Italian ones. Thus, by design of by default, the CEE political 
systems tend to cluster towards the middle of the scale, which has pure 
presidentialism at one end and parliamentarism at the other.  
In order to analyze the structure of governments in the ten countries we employ a 
twofold categorization of their components that is common in the theory of public 
administration: line and staff agencies. Central ministries are always a bit of both, 
of course, but depending on their main functional purpose one or the other 
character tends to predominate. So that we can distinguish: 
• Line ministries – they manage a certain segment of the public sector defined 
functionally and usually provide certain identifiable public goods 
• Coordination ministries – they supervise the inter-sectoral governmental 
action, manage cross-departmental programs and perform other functions that 
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cannot be specified in terms of public goods provision, like generating 
forecasts and strategic plans. In this category we can distinguish: 
(b1) Prime Minister’s office, with or without an additional ministry of the 
Chancellery attached 
(b2) Ministries of economy and development 
(b3) Ministries of administrative coordination 
It becomes now apparent, following data in Tab. 1, that Romania’s institutional 
problem has several related aspects: a high overall number of ministries; a high 
level of instability of agencies, especially those in charge with coordination; and, 
as a result of the institutional proliferation, a certain degree of overlapping and 
ambiguity in the coordination structures. 
 
The fragmentation of central government 
The data presented in the table show a marked separation of countries into two 
groups: 
1. Romania and Italy, where the number of portfolios is around 25 (the small size 
of Isărescu cabinet was the exception rather than the rule in Romania) 
2. All the other countries, with 17 ministries at most, the PM included. For the 
other candidate countries the average is 15.8 portfolios. In other words, a 
regular post-Communist government (and functional, as we see from the good 
performance of these countries in the accession process) is 40% smaller than 
Romania’s.  
There is an obvious trade-off between the size and the operational effectiveness of 
cabinets. When governments grow too large and fragmented to make truly 
collective decisions on specific agenda items, as they are supposed to do, the 
whole process of decision-making becomes slower, less transparent and more 
likely to be captured by sectoral vested interests. Not only continental 
democracies1, but also the Anglo-Saxon countries have recognized these 
difficulties lately and reduced substantially the size of their cabinets in a move to 
make them more effective and strategically driven (Australia in 1987, Canada in 
1993)2. When they joined the democratic world at the beginning of the last decade, 
most of the CEE countries adopted this conservative view in respect to cabinet 
structures and set up fewer and larger umbrella central departments that can 
integrate many issues before bringing them on the cabinet’s agenda. This structure 
                                                    
1  Blondel, J., and F. Muller Rommell, 1997. Cabinets in Western Europe. St. Martin’s 
Press, NY.  
2  Campbell, C., and J. Halligan, 1992. Leadership in the Age of Constraint: The 
Australian Experience. Allen&Unwin, Sidney. 
Campbell, C., 2000. ‘Democratic Accountability and Models of Governance: 
Purchaser/Provider, Owner/Trustee’. In R. Chapman (ed) Ethics in Public Service for the 
New Millenium. Aldershot, UK.  
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has also the advantage of cutting down on the overhead costs associated with 
corporate services in multiple ministries.  
On the contrary, Romania went on with an expanded Soviet-style arrangement that 
tends to preserve the status quo, where narrow issues are assigned to a series of 
central agencies expected to execute diligently pre-defined budgetary items and 
effectiveness is measured in terms of inputs. Reallocations are difficult to operate, 
both because of the opposition of administrative staff and the lack of information 
about actual performance, while the policy agenda is strongly influenced by the 
pressures to continue existing programs. Cutting down bureaucracy is always the 
talk of the day, but very few public institutions are ever reformed or rationalized. 
Most often across-the-board reductions are implemented3 – even though this is the 
poorest remedy in a fragmented and unstable institutional structure because it does 
not discriminate between useful and useless agencies – just to be gradually 
reversed in the following period.  
Among the EU countries Italy comes closer to this description. The 
high number of portfolios in the two countries cannot be entirely 
explained by the particularities of their party systems, which are very 
fragmented and produce short-lived coalition governments with 
numerous partners who enter the power-sharing game (although this 
may be a reason, of course). Finland, Hungary, or the Baltic states 
are also ruled by coalitions and have fragmented parliaments, 
without the executive becoming unstable. The explanation is more 
profound, having to do with the characteristics of the political class, 
historical tradition and incentives built into the politico-administrative system. Of 
course, the situation is far worse in Romania, where a flawed institutional design is 
combined with the inheritance of the communist regime4. The Romanian political 
parties are made of small coteries of people with little or no idea what the task of 
ruling a country means. The governing is most often done, more or less routinely, 
by an uneasy combination of old-time Communist bureaucrats, the only ones who 
posses the group discipline and determination to accomplish anything, and foreign 
donors. The Romanian communist regime was much closer and repressive than its 
Central European counterparts, and thus did not allow the emergence of an 
alternative elite, or even a decent category of technocrats who can understand and 
manage policy reforms. What is more, the post-communist politics did not manage 
to discredit and exclude important political and economic actors linked with the 
                                                    
3  The last right after the Nastase cabinet took office; the initial call was for a 30% 
reduction in staff, but our estimates for the actual figure in central government by March 
2001 revolve around 7-10% at the highest – see Ghinea C., 2001. The Reform of the Civil 
Service in Romania. Crisis Paper series, no. 2, Romanian Academic Society (SAR), 
Bucharest.  
4 “Sultanistic communism” as Juan Linz aptly characterized the Ceausescu unique blend 
of inept Soviet-style bureaucracy and Balkan-style nationalism, arbitrariness and clannish 
behavior (Linz, J.,1990. “Democratic Transitions”, Washington Quarterly, summer). 
Romania has one of the 
largest and most 
functionally unstable 
cabinets in Europe.  
It has 40% more 
portfolios than the 
average CEE cabinets. 
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previous regime. The researchers of transitions consider this factor a strong 
predictor for slow and muddled reforms5. 
Entrenched bureaucracies have learned from experience that they can always 
prevail in the long run by paying lip service to reforms while resisting them tacitly. 
They do not like coherent strategies, transparent regulations and written laws, but 
status quo and daily instructions received directly from above. This was how the 
communist regime worked and, as many scholars noted, after it collapsed the old 
chain of command fell apart but the deep contempt for law and transparent action 
remained a constant of the daily life6. This institutional culture is self-perpetuating, 
both in the professional civil service and the political class. The change of 
generations is not going to alter the rules of the game as long as the recruitment 
and socialization follow the same old pattern: graduates from universities with low 
standards7 are hired through clientelistic mechanisms; performance on the job is 
not measured; tenure and promotion are gained exclusively through internal power 
struggles. The average minister today focuses less on getting things done and more 
on developing supportive networks, because having collaborators one can trust 
with absolute loyalty is the obsession of all Romanian politicians and the reason 
why they avoid formal institutional cooperation or independent expertise. In other 
words, policymaking is reduced to nothing more than politics by other means. And 
when politics is extremely personalistic and fragmented, turf war becomes the rule 
all across the public sector.  
 
Fluidity of structures  
Not only that Romania has many ministries and agencies, but they appear, 
disappear or change their attributions and subordination very often. The immediate 
consequence is that the institutional memory of these agencies is lost and we see 
little continuity in terms of programs, staff and documents that might lead in the 
long term to an improvement in performance. The best example here is the central 
economic coordination (more about it below). In the last six or seven years we 
have assisted to a whole game of musical chairs: the ministries of Privatization, 
Reform, Economy, Development and Forecast were set up, dismantled and then 
revived at such a pace that their employees did not have the time to realize what 
they were actually supposed to do. The reasons of this generalized institutional 
muddle are manifold. At a very basic level, there is obviously a lack of vision 
about the role the state should play in the process of reform. Second, defining 
priorities has always been a problem – when everything is a top priority that needs 
to be addressed on the spot, this means there are no genuine priorities and 
                                                    
5  Nelson, J., 1995. ‘Linkages Between Politics and Economics’, in Diamond and Plattner 
(eds) Economic Reform and Democracy, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
6  Anders Åslund, 1995. ‘The Case for Radical Reform’, in Diamond and Plattner (eds) 
Economic Reform and Democracy, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.   
7  This is a problem still underestimated by the Western donors and analysts who are more 
familiar with the situation in Latin America or India, where, in spite of the social problems 
and high inequality, a well-educated elite exists with polished manners and managerial 
skills perfectly up to the Western standards. 
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strategies, only momentary reactions to events and constraints which are 
exogenous to the act of governing.  
But there is also a more down-to-earth explanation for this instability. When the 
winners of the 2000 elections began to restructure all the ministries and agencies, 
some changes were made just in order to get rid of civil servants who had become 
irremovable under the law passed in 1999. This law was part of the EU 
conditionality when Romania was invited to start the negotiation process at the 
Helsinki summit in late 1999. Its purpose was to insulate the public officials from 
political pressure and institute a civil service with a European-style discipline, 
professionalism and esprit de corps. It is debatable whether this was a realistic or 
even desirable goal, given the current situation in the public administration. Maybe 
a better idea would have been to adopt a more liberal model where the 
politicization of the top civil service is openly recognized as inevitable, and thus 
officialize and regulate by law a practice which is anyway well-entrenched and 
tacitly accepted in Romania. But once a law was adopted, the governments were 
expected to be at least more careful in dealing with the civil service. Instead, the 
2001 institutional reshuffle constituted a gross violation of the spirit of the law: by 
simply changing their names the new administration has “reorganized” many 
institutions and thus purged the public sector of those unwanted civil servants who 
were hired under the previous administration by passing an exam.  
There is a certain taste for ambiguity in Romania which goes beyond the way laws 
are interpreted and enforced. The institutional structure is also relatively tolerant of 
uncertainties and overlaps, which reflects the incapacity of the political process to 
reach clear decisions, especially when certain programs must be terminated. One 
can find arrangements in which second-tier institutions established in various 
political eras or shaped after the prescriptions of various donors come together in a 
complex and unworkable whole (see for example the saga of the Regional 
Development Agencies or EU Sapard program, discussed below). The 
administration is made up of layers of organizations that emerge, gradually 
exfoliate and fall into irrelevance together their political sponsors, but for some 
reason still hang around even when their attributions were reassigned to other 
structures.  
 
Civil service issues 
In such an unstable environment, the life of civil servants is tough and resembles 
very little the one of their Western counterparts. The combined action of 
uncertainty and low payment – insufficient for sustaining a decent level of life 
even at modest Romanian standards – creates a civil service who is not only less 
professional than the one in developed countries, but also much more 
heterogeneous. The majority of its members are old petty apparatchiks or new 
dropouts from the private sector. Frustrated by their low income but unsure enough 
of their own skills to cling to their existing jobs, they dully execute daily routines, 
play the bureaucratic power-games and yield to any sort of political pressure 
coming from above. They pursue a chameleonic strategy: placate the political 
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masters and try to extract whatever petty informal advantages they can from their 
position. 
On the other hand, a fireball strategy is pursued by a small number of people, 
especially at higher echelons, who regard a stage in the civil service as an 
investment in their professional CV, political career, or a step towards a more 
lucrative job in the private sector or with a foreign organization; or, sometimes, 
they may be driven by a less virtuous motivation. Some of them may even be 
educated in the West and thus constitute nuclei of competence in their immediate 
environment, but their tenure tend to be short and there is no long-term impact on 
the overall performance of the institutions. These are the persons whom the typical 
Western donor meet and talk to, and hence the widespread impression that the 
situation in the public sector is better than it really is. There may be differences in 
the level of professionalization and stability between institutions, of course. It has 
been noted before that the central banks and finance ministries in developing 
countries, for example, are the first to develop “linkage elites” who speak the 
conceptual language of their Western colleagues (Nelson, 1995). However, their 
numbers are yet too small to alter the overall picture of the civil service: a mass of 
disgruntled and ineffective staff punctured with small and transient groups who 
understand and try to push the reforms forward.  
Actually, there is no civil service as such in Romania. There are only individuals 
with various degrees of political involvement, holding public office under some 
formal conditions of service, sporadically applied, whose social status is that they 
occupy specific posts in ministries, agencies or local governments. There is no 
unified structure to run this army of people and no integrity to its 
body, and even its territorial limits are fuzzy. Many government 
institutions and agencies employ public-interest arguments in order 
to create special rules applicable only to their situation, or manage to 
get tacitly accepted practices that deviate from the general norm. Job 
descriptions are unclear, performance on the job is not measured in 
order to be rewarded − and the very concept of performance 
measurement is still strange to top public managers. Again, loyalty 
to the boss and the institution is the only thing that pays-off. 
Overstaffing may coexist with understaffing, often within the same 
institution, but it is hard to identify objectively from outside what the situation is 
and force changes in the right direction. There are no reliable estimates available 
of the costs of this “civil service” to society, hiring and firing practices, salary 
rules and levels. A simple question like “how much does X earn per year” is 
difficult to answer, and even perceived as improper or slightly offensive, since 
every agency devised its own arrangement of bonuses and off-the-book 
compensations that would rather not discuss in public. As a result, it is impossible 
to develop a system to manage the “civil service” more predictably, or introduce 
modern motivational elements such as career schemes and training-related 
promotions. Ultimately, the idea of political independence of administration is still 
alien in the Romanian context, where the assumption is that parties winning 
elections will apportion all things public among themselves and run the show by 
Civil service is 
parochial, politicized, 
hard to assess in terms 
of performance, and 
unruly. These flaws 
become more visible 
when dealing with the 
2nd generation reforms 
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direct order. Though hard to measure, there is strong anecdotal evidence that the 
policy performance of this system is very low. 
Some things can be accomplished especially in the first stages of reform, with 
measures requiring technical capacity of design, but little administrative capacity 
of implementation, and thus likely to be promoted quickly by a small circle of 
senior officials with political support (early price and trade liberalization, 
dismantlement of old regulatory mechanisms, tax reforms, pension reforms)8. But 
as post-communist reforms enters the second stage, where more complex public 
systems involving many stakeholders should be changed, the coherence and 
professionalism of bureaucracy becomes a crucial factor. In Romania, while the 
reforms of type one were more or less successfully pressed upon bureaucracies by 
the linkage elites and political leaders, the attempts to implement reforms of type 
two led to bureaucratic sabotage and open backlashes against the initiators. 
Moreover, when arbitrary and politically-driven purges of the civil service occur, 
like the one mentioned before, the people who make up the small pockets of 
expertise are the first to disappear from the public institutions – either because they 
were the most visibly associated with the political sponsors of reforms or because 
they are the most professionally mobile anyway.  
 
Proliferation of line ministries  
Romania has copied, maybe on purpose, maybe out of cultural affinity, the rich 
and expanded structure of line ministries that we see in other Latin states like 
France or Italy9, with bizarre and useless portfolios like Youth and Sport, 
Scientific Research and Tourism. If PSD, the current ruling party, will have at 
some point to make a coalition with a partner more significant than the tiny PUR 
(junior partner in government) it is quite possible that new ministries will appear, 
like the Italian-style Equal Chances. Pointing out exactly what public programs 
have managed in the last ten years the ministries mentioned above and in what 
way has the community actually benefited from their existence is quite a 
challenge. Usually they proclaim vague objectives like “the advancement of 
youth”, “investments for tomorrow”, “the promotion of tourism” – but we have yet 
to see how these can be operationalized and put into practice. Some money were 
indeed distributed to athletes and researchers, but the amounts were small anyway. 
A number of evaluation boards convening periodically would do the same job at 
much lower administrative cost, replacing the full-time bureaucracy of the sports 
and state-sponsored research establishments, engaged in constant efforts to justify 
its existence.  
The fundamental problem is one of vision: if something is considered important 
and positive for development (tourism, small and medium enterprises, IT) a 
ministry is quickly set up to take care of the thing. No serious analysis is done (1) 
                                                    
8  Nelson, J., Op. cit.  
9 But not the one from Spain which, with only 15 ministries, is closer to the rational 
structure of North and Central Europe, as we see from the table. It turns out that cultural 
affinities are to some extent selective, after all. 
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to see if the state can indeed intervene in that sector with positive results by 
creating a special agency; and (2) if it can, to see if there are already other 
mechanisms for intervention in place, and thus avoid the institutional duplication. 
Sometimes the answer to (1) is no, and the things should stop here. There is 
nothing in the way of public goods in what the Ministry of Youth and Sports does. 
Its continuation is a combined effect of institutional inertia and vested interests. 
Rich states like France or Italy can afford such harmless distractions; the post-
Communist ones, facing hard constraints in resource allocation, cannot.  
The situation is similar in the IT sector. Promotion of IT was emphasized as a 
government priority just in order to reshape the Agency for Communications and 
transform it (back) into a ministry. Though in its third year of existence, it is still 
not clear what exactly was this new ministry supposed to do, when the few 
programs that can be conceived are already assigned to other line ministries: the 
connection of schools to Internet is managed by Education (with support from the 
World Bank), the informatization of the health care system is coordinated by the 
Health ministry and the regional insurance agencies, the reform of tax collection 
by Finance and the local governments, etc. For some reason and in spite of a long 
experience of failures, the ruling party still believes that a ministry is able to help 
the private sector – companies, providers, banks – to adopt the new technologies, 
make sound investments and enter new markets when they exist. The IT 
companies do not harbor such illusions, but will always be happy to have one of 
their own people in the cabinet meetings, someone to call and ask for tax 
exemptions. And usually the ministry delivers: the first act originating in this 
ministry after taking office was a personal income tax break for experts working in 
IT companies, a very controversial piece legislating implicit social transfers from 
the general population to young, urban, professionally mobile and 
relatively rich citizens. We have good examples of new industries that 
have thrived in Romania in the last years without any public 
interference (or, maybe, precisely because of that): mobile telephony, 
cable TV, Internet providers. If anything, the Internet-related industry 
is held back by the antiquated infrastructure, a problem aggravated not 
by the market forces but by the poorly designed and half-hearted 
privatization of the national telephony monopoly. After passing the tax break the 
new minister, an energetic and otherwise well-meaning person, is having a hard 
time making himself useful. He drafted a law of electronic signature that many 
experts in the industry consider premature, given the current underdevelopment of 
the e-commerce in Romania and the quick changes occurring at the global level. 
And in the time left he meddled in the privatization process, just enough to mess 
up the scheduled sell of a state monopoly radio network. This kind of 
hyperactivism with high-tech undertones, attempting to produce big strategic 
designs for the “informational society”, suspiciously resembles the “techno-
scientific revolution” brandished upon us by the Communist Party in the ‘80s10.  
                                                    
10 All the more so since there is definitely a continuity in terms of people: some close 
associates of President Iliescu were prominent promoters of the Sci-Fi propaganda during 
the Communist regime. 
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Even when a decision is made to pursue interventionist policies, for example by 
stimulating investment in IT or encouraging small and medium enterprises (some 
are for, some against such measures, but this is another discussion), this is usually 
accomplished through fiscal instruments or interventions on the labor market, i.e. 
measures perfectly applicable within the existing framework. Again, it is not clear 
what is the purpose of setting up ministries like the one for Small and Medium 
Enterprises, and what is its staff going to do in the daily hours of office. Like any 
government organization with no precise and measurable goals, the chances are 
that it will become a public structure captive to some pressure groups, a lobby 
agency paid from the budget and with a toe in government11. 
There is no doubt that some regulatory functions must be performed by the state in 
a well-functioning market economy. They are usually assigned to small and non-
political agencies, with stable and specialized staff and, since what they do is 
mostly routine job, no high-profile politician at the top. The Agency for 
Communication establishes technical standards and organizes auctions for the 
allocation of bandwidth when the need arises. The Office of Tourism promotes on 
contractual basis cities, regions or programs operated by private companies. And 
the Competition Supervisory Board oversees the business environment in all 
industries according to some principles which are few, transparent and generally 
applicable, whether the economic actors concerned are public companies or private 
firms, big, medium sized or small. It is very unlikely that the tourism sector or 
SMEs will be better off in Romania than in Hungary, Czech Republic or Poland 
just because there are now some ministries in Bucharest to look after them. 
 
Dispersion of responsibilities in coordination  
The things look even worse if we analyze the coordination ministries, where the 
proliferation of institutions and instability are the norm and the apportionment of 
responsibilities depends heavily on the person who occupies the top office at a 
particular moment. By contrast, the cabinets in the other CEE countries tend to be 
characterized by: 
• A strong PM with stable political base in the legislative and functions of inter-
agency coordination which are defined more formally. In countries like 
Hungary, where the President has practically no executive attributions, the 
PM’s office has a minister-delegate for national security attached.  
• A clear assignment of responsibilities in matters of economic policy, whether 
the PM or a super-ministry of the Economy is in charge. Usually this 
arrangement makes the Ministry of Industry and Trade redundant. When MIT 
exists, however, like in the Czech Republic or Finland, there are no other 
parallel structures to dilute its responsibilities and certain continuity in terms of 
institutions and policies is assured. 
                                                    
11 That this ministry was assigned to a minuscule party which is just a façade for a 
controversial domestic business group, makes this hypothesis even more plausible. 
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• No other special institutions for coordination and administrative reform, other 
than the PM’s office and the Chancellery. Separate Ministries of Public 
Function, Institutional Reform or even Relations with the Parliament are 
unheard of. These too are Franco-Italian specialties adopted in Romania in 
spite of their questionable usefulness – even in their countries of origin it is 
hard to see what difference they have made since their inception more than a 
decade ago. 
Bureaucratic expansion and fluidity in the area of economic co-ordination, though 
not the only sources of problems, contributed substantially to the delay of 
economic reforms in the last ten years. As mentioned before, we have seen a 
merry-go-round of agencies of Privatization, Development, ministries of Reform, 
Privatization, Industry and Trade (with or without Trade, recently transferred to 
the Foreign Affairs), Economic coordination, all of them more or less at odds with 
the premiers, the Finance Ministry and the State Ownership Fund (the quasi-
ministry responsible for privatization). The former center-right government of 
Isărescu reduced the attributions and staff of SOF only days before it stepped 
down and charged the National Agency for Regional Development (ANDR) with 
overseeing the post-privatization process in territory. The current government 
quickly reversed the decision: it brought post-privatization back to SOF, raised this 
body to ministry status, and instead incorporated ANDR into a brand-new Ministry 
of Development and Forecast. MDF is a complete novelty in post-Communist 
Romania, it is likely to be scrapped soon, yet nobody knows yet what exactly was 
it supposed to be: the former Minister of Economy (now dismantled)? the former 
State Committee for Planning (CSP) of the Communist times? or just a 
government think tank? 
The transformation of Sate Ownership Fund into a ministry is not necessarily a bad 
thing, making the privatization process more clearly a government responsibility. 
But this also signals the failure of privatization policy as the previous PSD 
government in 1992-95 initially designed it. Any pretension that the process of 
privatization has finality is now abandoned and the discussion going 
on in the last year and a half, that there should be a firm deadline for 
selling the state industrial property and dismantling the State 
Ownership Fund, is suspended. The new ministry will probably have 
a long and happy life administering the post-privatization policy, a 
task even trickier and more difficult to measure than privatization 
itself. Moreover, since its head is now a powerful minister among his 
peers, he will probably use his leverage in order to slow down privatization, keep 
as many companies as possible in his portfolio and, since PSD is a leftist post-
Communist party reluctant to sell assets quickly to foreign big investors, try to do 
‘restructuring before privatization’12. Which means even more delays, soft lending 
                                                    
12 A policy very much like the one pursued in the Czech Republic by the leftist minister of 
industry, Miroslav Gregr. No sooner had the new minister been appointed than he got 
involved in a row with the mayor of Bucharest, trying to press him into buying Romanian-
made buses which are expensive and unreliable. He also started to advocate dubious 
schemes of state-subsidized acquisition of trucks and agricultural equipment produced by 
two bankrupt companies based in Braşov. 
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through state-owned banks and distribution of favors to well connected industrial 
groups. On top of these problems, there were new rounds of clashes between the 
ministries of Industry, Finance, Development and Forecasts and the Regional 
Developments Agencies (ADR, who supervise the investments in the special 
enterprise zones in their regions). 
When things were managed reasonably well, this happened in spite of the formal 
government structures rather than because of them. During the previous center-
right Isărescu mandate the economic policy was firmly controlled by the premier 
and its circle of advisers, usually young and Western-educated economists. The 
Ministry of Economy was a ghost structure set up to placate the senior Christian 
Democrats, the main force of the coalition at that moment, when their party lost 
the office of prime-minister. The minister was very pleased with his formal 
position of vice-premier and did not intervene in either strategy-making or daily 
management. Such an arrangement cannot be stable in the long run, however, 
especially when the new premier has no experience in economic management. If 
the minister of Finance is entrusted with more power to coordinate policy, as it 
seems to be the case now, there are periodical rebellions of the other ministers who 
would not accept to be bossed around by one of their colleagues to whom they 
have no formal subordination. Unfortunately, Romania has ignored the French 
model exactly when it could have offered an example of best-practice: a single 
umbrella structure of economic management with precise assignment of 
responsibilities, partly reproduced in some other countries as well. These large 
conglomerate ministries can advance integration of policies in-house before taking 
the matters to the cabinet, and therefore decrease the influence of sectoral pressure 
groups and produce more coherent, strategy-oriented blueprints, which is exactly 
what the economic policy-making in Romania badly needs.  
Equally unclear is the situation of the development programs and European 
integration coordination – two domains closely related in the CEE states. Save for 
Slovakia, we are the only country with a special portfolio for Integration; but we 
also have a chief-negotiator who is also a minister. The chapters of the accession 
are negotiated by technical teams of experts coordinated by the chief negotiator, 
who had existed before and reported directly to the PM. One wonders what is the 
point in setting up a whole ministry interposed between the negotiating teams and 
the PM’s office, with the chief negotiator left in an uncertain position.  
 
A decision-making process that does not make decisions 
And after all, if the Prime Minister does not co-ordinate the economic policy, nor 
the European integration or the institutional reforms (as we shall see below), what 
is the Romanian premier actually do, since the daily routine of the cabinet is taken 
care of by a Chancellery (General Secretariat) which is itself a ministry, apart from 
the PM’s office? The experience of the other CEE states show that the job can be 
done with much less line ministries and co-ordination offices, and with better 
results. After the institutional proliferation reaches a certain critical level, it looks 
like a meta-coordination body is necessary in order to coordinate the co-ordination 
process – and maybe this can be an answer to the question raised here about the 
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role of the premier. Sadly, the setting up of new institutions is regarded in 
Romania with a very liberal enthusiasm, and its negative impact on stability and 
organizational memory is overlooked. Tellingly, the current premier has justified 
the decision to establish a new Ministry of Integration as “a sign for a strategic 
direction of action” of utmost importance for Romania today. Nobody disputes 
that the direction is correct, but there can be cheaper ways to signal it and achieve 
the desired effect. 
In fact, although this government is perceived from abroad as more coherent and 
competent than the previous ones, this image has little support in reality. No 
substantial reforms were initiated in the last 2½ years, and nothing in the way the 
cabinet functions has changed for the better, though in principle the task should be 
easier now with a one-party government. The top actors, primarily the Prime 
Minister and the Secretary General of the cabinet, have failed to reform the 
protracted decision-making process, which is actually hard to call a “process” at 
all. Usually the choice in crucial policy areas is not made, but “happens” as a result 
of conflicting pressures from various agencies and lobby groups. Explicit 
strategies are missing, key options, broad policy principles and trade-offs are never 
discussed, and there are two explanations for this. First, they are not understood, 
since the ministries or the cabinet in its entirety do not have functioning policy-
analysis units, and distrust any advice from the independent experts (who are in 
short supply anyway). Second, there is no time to analyze and understand 
anything, the cabinet being constantly ambushed by bureaucratic entrepreneurs 
with hundreds of drafts of laws, decisions, norms dealing with narrow or trivial 
issues. There is no real delegation of authority at the lower level, and no competent 
upper-level bureaucracy able to process, integrate information, and present broad 
policy options to decision-makers. As a result there is no functioning information 
filter between lower and upper levels, and the decision becomes unpredictable, 
crisis-driven and many times irrelevant. Recent innovations, such as the weekly 
videoconference of the cabinet with county prefects and local government 
representatives, may be promoting some sense of openness and responsiveness in 
the system. But on the other hand it only aggravates these shortcomings by 
increasing the ah-hoc nature of governance.  
Ministries and central agencies do not cooperate or exchange 
information significantly, so cross-sectoral issues cannot be 
identified and dealt with. There are no policy documents circulated 
and discussed within the government, and largely no sense that 
there should be such a process. There is no policy unit at the 
central level that may help the cabinet produce and follow a 
coherent agenda. The formal requirement of inter-ministerial 
consultation apply to legal drafts only − which many times are 
poorly written, unclear about objective and means, and keep 
changing at source while they are being discussed in other 
institutions. The lack of policy documents, white books and other 
consultation papers written in plain language, publicized and 
discussed broadly was often singled out as one of the most 
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important, yet overlooked, governance flaws in Romania13. They should form the 
basis of strategic decision-making, while laws are just subsequent instruments to 
implement these decisions, once they are made. Instead, what happens is that ill-
considered laws originating in various ministries avoid hard policy choices 
through loopholes, omissions, vague legal language. When the law gets passed, the 
key policy issues are either decided in a haste, sometimes implicitly, in the 
secondary legislation (norms of implementation), in a process which is purely 
bureaucratic and unaccountable; or resurface in the process of implementation, so 
that everybody gets puzzled, agencies begin to apply the law discretionary, and the 
government rushes to pass another law (overnight, through emergency ordinance) 
to deal the aspects in question, which introduces additional fuzzy provisions − and 
so the treadmill goes on. In such an environment, reforms like the introduction of 
impact analysis of laws and regulations, or institutionalizing a feed-back system in 
the decision-making process, which have also been on the reform agenda in the 
last years and stressed by the donor community, appear completely unrealistic. 
For a better co-ordination with the legislative, the executive re-established the 
Ministry for the Relation with the Parliament, another Franco-Italian institutional 
borrowing adopted only by the Czech Republic and Slovakia. But it has also 
created special positions of secretary of state in all the line and economic 
ministries, with the specific task of representing the agencies in Parliament and 
improving the communication between the executive and legislative. Since the 
ministry of the Chancellery is already charged with the daily operations of the 
cabinet and the circulation of documents between the branches of the government, 
the managing structure resulted from this innovations is a complex 3-D matrix that 
poses co-ordination problems even in organizations that have vast resources and 
experience, like the World Bank.  
And, as it happens when institutions proliferate and overlap uncontrollably, there 
are crucial tasks that fall in-between and create permanent problems. This is the 
case with the regional development policies, whether they are financed from the 
budget, through World Bank loans or, as it is increasingly the case, through 
various grants and transfers from the European Union. The management of 
development programs has never been assigned clearly to a specific agency, and 
hence fierce battles occur between ministries whenever a new program appears. In 
1996 a network of 8 Regional Development Agencies (ADR) was set up, with 
each ADR based in one of the 8 regions of development14 defined by the 
government, plus a National Agency of Regional Development (ANDR) that was 
supposed to function as the hub of the network. The whole structure had the 
mission to consolidate itself and gradually train its staff so that it can manage the 
big programs EU usually implements in the candidate countries. After five years of 
running in with smaller components of the EU assistance, when the first sizable 
chunk of financing finally arrived in 1999 – the seven-year Sapard program of 
rural development – the whole structure was entirely by-passed by the very same 
central government that had set it up. The Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs 
                                                    
13 Romania: Policy-Making and Co-ordination Assessment. Sigma program, 2002.  
14 EU-type, NUTS2 regions.  
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and Agriculture tried to outmaneuver each other and take over the management of 
Sapard, and at no point was there any chance that ANDR could be involved. 
Agriculture won eventually, in spite of the fact that it had failed spectacularly with 
SPP, a pilot program one hundred times smaller than Sapard it had run through its 
territorial branches in 1998-99. The Ministry of Agriculture is one of the biggest 
and the most unreformed bureaucracies in Romania today, with antiquated 
procedures based on executing detailed budgetary items, aging staff and an 
institutional culture reminding of the Soviet bureaucracy in the Brejnev era. The 
local level cronyism and its image as a backwater tend to drive away the few 
talents that may happen to be in its apparatus. Under these circumstances, 
entrusting it with the management of a multi-year program requiring territorial 
delegation of responsibilities, flexibility, program budgeting and the assessment of 
proposals coming from private agents is a wild bet15. 
Finally, the institutional reform itself was subject to continuous transformation. 
The former Department for Local Administration, a government sub-unit with 
clear attributions and enough reform on its hands to deal with, was expanded so as 
to perform some new functions that are hard to define and lead to outcomes that 
are difficult to measure. The new Ministry of Public Function (renamed Ministry 
of Public Administration, MPA) should be, according to the Franco-Italian model, 
a human resource management unit for the whole central public administration, 
while continuing to fulfill its old duties of overseeing the decentralization process, 
local governments reform and coordinating the activity of the county prefects (the 
central government representatives in territory). After almost three years of 
activity the two components of MPA have yet to be integrated into a single 
coherent structure, and it is hard to see a real basis for such integration. Moreover, 
the functioning of its Public Function component is sometimes sabotaged by the 
other central institutions. As said before, the new ministers appointed in December 
2000 changed the charts of their departments in order to claim 
they are handling new units and get rid of the civil servants 
protected by the EU-type 1999 law. According to its provisions 
the MPA should be notified of all severances and try to find 
work for the civil servants before giving up on them entirely. 
This did not happen. The Agency for Public Servants, part of 
MPA, complained that most ministries did not even bother to let 
it now what changes they operated in charts and personnel 
among the almost 30,000 civil servants of the central 
administration. It may well be that all these institutional 
adjustments are not motivated by the desire to make them functional, but simply to 
accommodate political cronies. In January 2001 the ‘Presidency of Romania’ was 
turned into ‘The Presidential Administration’. Merely changing the name allowed 
the severing of tenths of public servants who should have been protected.  
The permanent drive towards expansion and reshuffles can therefore be explained 
at least in part by the desire of the new government to fire civil servants in order to 
                                                    
15  In an uncharacteristic burst, even the minister of Agriculture lost his temper once and 
declared that there is nobody in the whole ministry who is able to write or manage 
programs. 
Romania’s EU accession 
may derail due to poor 
governance. 
Without local policy 
capacity, the acquis may 
become just another legal 
Potemkin structure. 
 ROMANIAN ACADEMIC SOCIETY (SAR) 
Crisis Papers series, No. 2 
 
make room for its own clients. These replacements are subject to underground 
negotiations currently going on between PSD and the opposition parties, who try 
to protect their people in office. The external donors operating in Romania are also 
concerned about the fate of the officials they invested in through various training 
and assistance programs. Although perfectly legitimate, such concerns should not 
obscure the bigger picture. We believe that more important for Romania is now a 
rational overhaul of the whole public sector (of the ‘state’) which should consist in 
a redefinition of the main institutions in terms of concrete functions, based on the 
existing domestic and regional experience. Overlaps and camouflage jargon should 
be abandoned, whether it is the old, Soviet-style, or the new one emanating from 
Brussels. Before we look at who occupies what office, we should make sure that 
that particular office is really necessary, has enough resources to perform its duties 
and the tasks are clearly defined. And that a clear decision-making process is 
created allowing the cabinet to perform its strategic duties, assisted by policy-
analysis units and a workable bureaucracy that translate decisions into procedures 
without changing their content. Eventually, is important to stop the heroic effort to 
create a new Romania through the rapid erection of Potemkin legal structures, 
some of them pertaining to the functioning of the government itself. And instead 
develop some domestic capacity to understand what is going on in society, and 
project sensible, EU-compatible, but locally generated policies.  
 
 
